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Abstract
This paper explores how trade openness affects both product and
process innovation in a factor proportions model of trade and firm
heterogeneity. Trade openness expands the profit opportunities of the
most productive firms and expels the less efficient firms out of the
market, making process innovation more attractive for the most pro-
ductive firms in both industries. Incentives, however, are larger in the
industry in which the country has the comparative advantage. Trade
also increases the profits of prospective entrants leading to an increase
in product innovation in the comparative advantage industry. In ad-
dition, I obtain a non-monotonic relationship between trade costs and
a country’s trade pattern: When the level of trade costs are high, a
reduction in trade costs leads to an increase in process innovation
in both industries, being stronger in the comparative advantage one;
when the trade costs are low the effect is stronger in the comparative
disadvantage one. This final result could rationalize recent empirical
findings suggesting that in the last half century the Ricardian com-
parative advantage has become weaker over time.
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1 Introduction
Neoclassical trade theories emphasize the role of differences in technology (Ri-
cardo (1817), Jones (1971), Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) Eaton
and Kortum (2002)) or differences in factor endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin
(1933), Samuelson (1948, 1953)) to explain trade flows and trade patterns
across countries. New trade theories have incorporated scale economies at an
industry and firm level to explain several features of the data that the neo-
classical theories were finding difficult to explain like the intra-industry trade
phenomenon, or the fact that only a small proportion of firms within each
industry are exporting (Melitz (2003), Bernard, Jensen, Eaton and Kortum
(2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Chaney (2008)). While these theo-
ries have identified different institutional factors that may affect a country’s
specialisation pattern still, technological and factor endowment differences
across countries are at the heart of a country’s specialisation pattern. At the
empirical level, several studies have emphasized the importance of technology
and factor endowments in accounting for trade patterns and trade volumes
across countries. (Trefler (1993, 1995), Harrigan (1997), Romalis (2004) and
Morrow (2010).1
The new new trade theory based on firm heterogeneity and increasing re-
turns to scale developed by Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
has outlined a new mechanism through which trade increases welfare in trad-
ing countries: The impact of trade on technology through selection. Trade
through tougher competition expels the less efficient firms out of the market
reallocating market shares across the most productive surviving incumbents.
By concentrating the production in the most efficient industry units, this
increases an industry’s average productivity. A recent paper by Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007) outlines the importance of this mechanism to
establish a link between the previously discussed two potential sources of
comparative advantage: Differences in factor endowments through selection
generates a Ricardian comparative advantage. Tougher selection in the com-
parative advantage industry leads to a relatively larger increase in the average
productivity of that industry after trade openness.
This paper explores the link between technology and factor endowments,
by expanding a 2x2x2 standard model of trade, factor proportions and firm
1Trefler (1993,1995) obtain that while a standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model per-
forms poorly in the data, a slightly version of the model that include differences in tech-
nology across countries improves substantially the model fit. Harrigan (1997) and Morrow
(2010) examine instead the contribution of differences in TFP and differences in factor
abundance in determining specialisation.
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heterogeneity in which firms are allowed to upgrade their current state of
technology. In our setup there are two final good industries, each of them
characterized by a continuum of differentiated goods. The structure of each
industry, is similar to Melitz (2003): Firms pay a fixed cost to create a new
variety which allows them to enter in the market. To produce, firms use a
linear technology that involves the use of an industry specific intermediate
input. However, the firms’ productivity is uncertain at the moment of entry.
The industry-specific intermediate inputs are produced according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function that uses both skilled and unskilled labour in
different proportions across both final goods. After entry, productivity is
revealed to the firm and the firm chooses whether to stay in the market
and paying a per period fixed cost to produce. Once the firm has decided
to stay, the firm has the option to upgrade its current state of technology
by paying a fixed cost. In this framework I distinguish between process
innovation (technology upgrading) and product innovation (the creation of
new varieties).
Our results suggest that the selection effect found in Melitz (2003) leads
to a rise in technology upgrading in both industries. Interestingly, technology
upgrading is stronger in the industry in which the country has a compara-
tive advantage. The reason behind this result is the fact that trade expands
the business opportunities for the most productive firms in both sectors.
However, trade expands it to a greater extent in the comparative advantage
industry since the economy is able to offer these goods relatively cheaper
than the foreign counterpart. This rises the expected profits of prospective
entrants and induces a disproportionate entry in the comparative advantage
industry. As a consequence, the relative demand for the abundant factor rises
and this has a positive impact on the relative factor remuneration. Domestic
firms see their profits reduced and the less efficient ones need to exit. The
combination of a stealing business effect in the foreign country and a reallo-
cation of market shares from the less efficient firms which exit, towards the
most productive ones, induce a larger proportion of firms to upgrade their
technology. Overall, technology upgrading rises in both industries and the
comparative advantage industry enjoys more product and process innova-
tions compared to an autarkic scenario. Using R&D intensities as a measure
of innovation activity, the model predicts that trade openness increases the
relative R&D intensity favouring the comparative advantage industry one.
These last results reinforce the Ricardian-led-factor endowment comparative
advantage by having a positive effect on within plant productivity improve-
ments.
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A further section in the paper explores the evolution of the comparative
advantage by considering a reduction of trade costs when both industries
are opened to trade. The results establishes a non-monotonic relationship
between the level of trade costs and the evolution of comparative advantage:
When trade costs are high, a reduction in trade costs increases technology
upgrading and R&D intensities relatively more in the comparative advan-
tage industry. This induces TFP divergence across sectors. However, if the
trade costs are low enough a reduction in trade barriers increases technology
upgrading and R&D intensities in the comparative disadvantage industry
leading to TFP convergence across industries. Overall, average productivity,
the proportion of firms that upgrade their technology and R&D intensities
increase in both industries as trade costs fall. However, provided that there
is self-selection into exporting markets, these three dimensions are always
larger in the comparative advantage industry. This suggests that a gradual
reduction in trade costs may eventually strengthen the pattern of compar-
ative advantage at the initial stages while weaken it when the trade costs
become sufficiently low.
This paper is related to several literatures. The first one is the literature
on the effects of trade openness and trade liberalisation on innovation. A
recent literature based on models with firm heterogeneity outlines the im-
portance of selection effects in promoting process innovation (Atkeson and
Burstein (2010), Bustos (2011), Impulliti and Licandro (2011), Navas and
Sala (2007,2013), Long et al. (2010) and Mrazova and Neary (2011) among
others). Unlike those papers we study the role played by factor endowments
in determining the effect that trade has on innovation at the industry level.
My model suggests that differences in factor intensities across industries and
factor endowments across trade partners, may generate asymmetries in pro-
ductivity and innovation across industries that in autarky exhibit identical
productivity distributions. The second dimension is clearly a determinant of
the dynamic evolution of the industry’s average productivity.
This paper is also related to the literature that incorporates differences
in factor endowments in models of trade with economies of scale(Krugman
(1981), Helpman and Krugman (1987) (HK)). Those papers obtain the in-
teresting result that most of the findings in the Heckscher-Ohlin model are
also present in an environment in which there are increasing returns to scale
at the firm level. More recently, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) (BRS)
incorporates a factor proportions theory into a standard Melitz (2003) model
of trade with firm heterogeneity and finds that the same H-O results are also
present when we allow productivity to vary across firms. They also find that
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differences in factor endowments together with trade openness can generate
a Ricardian comparative advantage as explained above. This paper goes in
line with the above papers and reinforces the idea that the H-O results are
robust to richer environments. In addition, by including the possibility of
firms to technology upgrade, this paper finds that differences in factor in-
tensities across industries and factor endowments across countries generates
a different impact on trade-induced plant productivity improvements across
firms with the same initial productivity. This result reinforces the early find-
ings by BRS on Ricardian-led-factor endowment comparative advantage by
having an impact on average industry productivity while it also suggests that
this Ricardian advantage may persist along time.
Finally, this paper is related to a recent literature that investigates the
evolution of comparative advantage. In a very interesting study, Levchenko
and Zhang (2011) obtain that, contrary to the common knowledge, in the
last 50 years on average, productivity has increased by more in a coun-
try’s revealed comparative disadvantage industries. My paper suggests a
non-monotonic relationship between trade costs and the pattern of compar-
ative advantage and for sufficiently low level of trade costs, a reduction in
trade barriers may benefit the comparative disadvantage industry, narrow-
ing the differences in TFP across industries within a country. The evidence
of Levchenko and Zhang (2011) could be consistent within this framework
with a gradual reduction in trade barriers across countries provided that the
initial level of trade costs were sufficiently low in the 1960s.
Section 2 of the paper describes the main elements of the model in au-
tarky. On section 3, I discuss the main properties of the model in costless
trade. In section 4, I discuss the most realistic case in which the economy
is open to trade but trade is costly (both in variable and fixed trade barri-
ers). In section 5, I analyze the effect of trade liberalisation (understood as
a reduction in variable trade barriers). Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of consumers. There are two
final goods. Let denote with Ci the consumption of good i = 1, 2. Each Ci is
a composite good defined over a continuum of varieties belonging to the set
Ωi. Preferences over these goods are given by the following utility function:
U(C1, C2) = (C1)
α (C2)
1−α
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C1 =
 ∫
ωΩ1
(q1 (ω))
σ−1
σ dω
 σσ−1
C2 =
 ∫
ωΩ2
(q2 (ω))
σ−1
σ dω
 σσ−1
Solving the consumer’s problem we arrive to the standard CES aggregate
demand function for each variety of the composite good:
qi (ω) =
Ri
Pi
(
pi(ω)
Pi
)−σ
where Ri denotes consumer’s expenditure dedicated to good i. Under Cobb-
Douglas preferences Ri = αiR where R denotes total revenue.
To produce, firms use an intermediate input (xi) that is homogeneous
to all products within the same industry but differ across industries. This
intermediate input is produced competitively combining both capital and
labor using the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
x1 = A1 (S1)
β1 (L1)
1−β1
x2 = A2 (S2)
β2 (L2)
1−β2
with Ai = (βi)
βi (1− βi)1−βi .
We assume without loss of generalization that β1 > β2.This implies that
the industry 1 uses intermediate inputs that are more skilled labour intensive.
Perfect competition in the intermediate input sector implies that:
pmi = (ws)
βi (wl)
1−βi
The production side in the final good sector is identical to Melitz (2003).
To enter in the market, a firm needs to invest fe units of the intermediate
input to create a new variety. Once the firm has created this variety the
firm obtains the monopoly rights to produce it. To produce, firms use a
technology which is linear in the intermediate input. More precisely:
qi(ϕi) = ϕixi
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However, firms’ productivity ϕi is unknown before the creation of this
new variety. More precisely, the firm knows that the productivity parameter
ϕ follows a random process with support [0,∞) and a cumulative continuous
distribution functionG(ϕ). After the investment in the creation of this variety
is undertaken, the productivity is revealed to the firm. The creation of new
varieties of the same composite good is considered here as product innovation.
To operate the technology the firm needs to pay a per period fixed investment
of fd units of the intermediate input. At this moment she needs to decide
whether to stay and produce.
Once the firm decides to stay and produce, the firm has the possibility to
adopt a new technology which improves their productivity by a factor of θi by
investing a fixed amount fI of the intermediate input of units. The process
of a firm’s technology upgrading will be denoted as process innovation. In
this version of the model, I consider that all activities within an industry
(product, process innovation, production and exporting when applies) use the
same intermediate input. Consequently, all activities within an industry has
the same factor intensity. However, these activities differ in factor intensities
across industries.
The firms’ problem is solved by backward induction. First, I solve for
the firm’s decision of technology upgrading. Then I solve for the the firm’s
decision of staying in the market taking into account its future decision of
technology upgrading. Finally, I solve for the firm’s entry decision, taking
into account the flow of expected profits in the industry.
Since the variety produced by each firm is unique, a firm charges the
standard monopoly price:
pi(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
pmi
ϕ
=
σ
σ − 1
ωi
(θi)
d ϕ
where d is the indicator function taking the value of 1 if the firm adopts the
new technology and ωi = (ws)
βi (wl)
1−βi . The firm’s operating profits are
given by the following expression:
pivi(ϕ) =
Ri
σ (Pi)
1−σ
(
ρ (θi)
d ϕ
)σ−1
(ωi)
1−σ =
riD(ϕ)
σ
.
Notice that the ratio between the revenue of two non innovative firms is given
by productivity ratio as in Melitz (2003) ( riD(ϕi)
riD(ϕj)
=
(
ϕi
ϕi
)σ−1
).
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A firm decides to adopt the new technology iff:(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)(riD(ϕ)
σ
)
≥ δfiIωi (1)
with equality if the firm is indifferent between adopting the technology or
staying with its current technology. Let denote with ϕiI the value of the
productivity of the indifferent firm, which we call the marginal innovator.
The firm is indifferent between staying or exiting the market when:
riD(ϕiD)
σ
= fiDωi (2)
This condition is known in the Melitz (2003) model as the ZP condition.
Dividing (1) and (2) we have that:(
ϕiI
ϕiD
)σ−1
=
(
δfiI
fiD
)
1(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)
Notice that the proportion of surviving firms undertaking process innova-
tion is independent of the factor prices and therefore on factor endowments
in autarky. This is the consequence of the fact that both activities are using
the same intermediate input and therefore they use the production factors
with the same intensity. Allowing for differences in factor intensities across
activities within an industry breaks this result. We leave this possibility for
future research.
Finally, a firm decides to enter in the industry iff E(V ) ≥ feiωi. In this
model we focus on steady state solutions. In steady state a firms’ value
function is given by the following expression:
Vi = max
{
0,
pivi (ϕ)
δ
,
pivi (θϕ)
δ
− fiIωi
}
(3)
2.1 Equilibrium in a Closed-Economy Model
One of the interesting properties of the Melitz-type models is that the equi-
librium of the economy, in our case perfectly characterized by the two pro-
ductivity thresholds ϕiI , ϕiD, can be summarised with two conditions: The
Zero Profit Condition (ZP) (Condition (2) in our model) and the Free En-
try condition (FE). In this framework however, we need an extra equation
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that comes from the Zero Innovation Profits condition (Condition (1) in our
model). The FE condition in this model becomes:((
ϕ˜iD
ϕiD
)σ−1
− 1
)
fiD+
(1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))
((
ϕ˜iI
ϕiI
)σ−1
− 1
)
δfiI =
δfei
(1−G(ϕiD)) .
The left hand side (lhs) of our FE condition is similar to a standard
heterogenous-firm trade model. There is, however, an extra term, the second
one, which represents the innovation profits. The possibility of technology
upgrading increases the expected value of profits from entry by increasing
the profits of the most productive firms.2 Compared to Melitz (2003), the
possibility of technology upgrading reallocates market shares from the less
productive firms to the most productive ones, making survival more difficult
in this economy. Consequently, ϕiD is larger in this case.
Despite the fact that this model exhibits a larger industry average produc-
tivity compared to a model without innovation due to the firm’s possibility of
technology upgrading, both sectors share the same productivity thresholds,
ϕiD, ϕiI and consequently the same average productivity, provided that the
rest of the parameters are identical in both industries. In autarky, differences
in factor endowments across countries are not generating differences in aver-
age productivity across industries.3 In the skilled-labour abundant country,
initially firms have larger expected profits in the comparative advantage in-
dustry (Industry 1) because marginal costs of production in that industry
are relatively smaller. Consequently, firms can charge relatively lower prices
and have relatively larger sales. However, the costs of entry are also smaller
in that industry, and this together with the rise in the expected profits of the
representative firm increases entry. The increase in entry offsets the positive
effect that the comparative advantage mechanism is having on firms’ profits.
However, as discussed above, there is more entry in the industry in which
the economy has the comparative advantage. Thus, the model generates
differences in the mass of surviving firms in equilibrium. To see this, notice
that:
M1
M2
=
R1
R2
r¯2
r¯1
=
α
1− α
(
ϕ˜2D
ϕ2D
)σ−1
σf2D (ω2)(
ϕ˜1D
ϕ1D
)σ−1
σf1D (ω1)
=
α
1− α
(
ws
wL
)β2−β1
(4)
2In Navas and Sala (2013) we show uniqueness of ϕD (and consequently ϕI). An
identical proof to show uniqueness of each ϕ will apply in this context.
3The same result has been found in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007).
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Our country is skilled-labor abundant. We show in the appendix that
this implies that: (
wHs
wHL
)
<
(
wFs
wFL
)
, since β1 > β2, this implies that:
MH1
MH2
>
MF1
MF2
.
This result is already present in standard models of trade with imper-
fect competition and increasing returns to scale (Helpman and Krugman,
1985). Unlike existing work, the innovation resources in this economy are
not constant across industries. The comparative advantage industry invests
more resources in both product and process innovation. R&D expenditures
in each sector are given by:
R&D expi = (feiMei + δfiIMiI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
amount of resources
(ωi)︸︷︷︸
Resource cost
Considering the stationarity condition for each sector and rearranging
terms:
R&D expi =
(
δfei
(1−G(ϕiD)) + δfiI
(1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))
)
Mi (ωi)
Since ϕiD, ϕiI are identical across industries, considering the ratio of
R&D expi across industries we have that:
R&D exp1
R&D exp2
=
M1
M2
(
ws
wL
)β1−β2
=
α
1− α.
While the relative R&D expenditures just depend on the size of the sector
α the amount of resources invested is larger in the industry in which the
economy has a comparative advantage. To see this, consider the simpler case
in which α = 1
2
. In this case the economy is investing the same amount of
income in innovation in both industries. However, in the industry in which
the economy has the comparative advantage, the cost of resources is cheaper,
and consequently this industry is investing in more resources.
A common indicator used in the industrial organization literature to mea-
sure the intensity of innovative activity within an industry is R&D intensity
( R&D expenditures
sales
).This measure corrects for the fact that R&D expenditures
are positively affected by the size of the industry. The model suggests that
R&D intensities are identical across industries as it can be seen below.
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
R&D exp1
R&D exp2
R2
R1
= 1.
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3 Costless Trade
In this section, I explore the implications of the model for innovation when
we consider a movement from autarky to free trade. Common to the new
literature on firm-heterogeneity and factor endowments, including innovation
in this environment does not alter the main properties of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model. Moreover, R&D intensities are still invariant across industries and
innovation does not have any impact on average productivity. In contrast
to the one derived in this section, under costly trade, R&D intensities differ
according to the comparative advantage. This has a clear impact on average
productivity across industries.
Consider the possibility that the firm can serve the foreign market at no
cost. The operating profits of a domestic firm in the domestic market is now
given by:
piHviD(ϕ) =
(
RH
σ (PHi )
1−σ
)(
ρ (θi)
d ϕ
)σ−1 (
ωHi
)1−σ
and the operating profits of a domestic firm in the foreign market is given
by:
piFviD(ϕ) =
(
RF
σ (P Fi )
1−σ
)(
ρ (θi)
d ϕ
)σ−1 (
ωHi
)1−σ
.
The marginal innovator in the Home country (H) must satisfy the follow-
ing condition:(
1 +
RF
RH
(
P Fi
PHi
)σ−1)(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1) riD(ϕiI)
σ
= δfiI
(
ωHi
)
where riD(ϕiI) =
(
RH
(PHi )
1−σ
)
(ρϕiI)
σ−1 (ωHi )1−σ
The marginal survival, the one indifferent between staying on leaving the
market is defined by the following condition:(
1 +
RH
RF
(
PHi
P Fi
)σ−1)
riD(ϕiD)
σ
= fiD
(
ωHi
)
Then we have that:(
ϕiI
ϕiD
)σ−1
=
(
δfiI
fiD
)(
1
(θi)
σ−1 − 1
)
(5)
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which is the same as in autarky. In fact since the operating profits for each
firm is a constant times the operating profits in autarky we have that the FE
condition is given by:((
ϕ˜iD
ϕiD
)σ−1
− 1
)
fiD+
(1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))
((
ϕ˜iI
ϕiI
)σ−1
− 1
)
δfiI =
δfei
(1−G(ϕiD))
(6)
which is identical to the one in autarky. Therefore productivity thresholds
are unchanged after trade openness when trade is costless. This implies that
the productivity distributions remain unchanged after trade openness but
costless trade.
The standard results in the Heckscher-Ohlin model are held in this en-
vironment. Factor Price Equalisation holds provided that economies do not
experience factor intensity reversals (i.e. factor endowments not to be very
different across countries). Unlike previous studies, trade has an impact on
innovation. Trade promotes investment in product innovation in the industry
in which the country has a comparative advantage.
In contrast, the relative R&D intensities are unchanged after trade open-
ness. To see this notice that the R&D intensity ratio is given by:
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
M1
M2
R2
R1
(
ws
wL
)β1−β2
But Ri = Mir¯i, then substituting we have that:
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
= r¯2
r¯1
(
ws
wL
)β1−β2
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
(((
ϕ˜2D
ϕ2D
)σ−1)
σf2D +
(1−G(ϕ2I))
(1−G(ϕ2D))
(
ϕ˜2I
ϕ2I
)σ−1
σδf2I
)
(ω2)(((
ϕ˜iD
ϕiD
)σ−1)
σf1D +
(1−G(ϕ1I))
(1−G(ϕ1D))
(
ϕ˜1I
ϕ1I
)σ−1
σδf1I
)
(ω1)
(
ω1
ω2
)
= 1
Costless trade does not have any impact on process innovation because it
does not alter the distribution of profits within the industry. When trade is
costless, trade openness widens the profit opportunities of all firms although
this increase is more pronounced in the industry in which the country has
the comparative advantage because the relative cost of factors is cheaper.
This induces entry and an increase in the relative demand for skilled labour.
The increase in entry perfectly offsets the increase in profit opportunities
and leaves the market share of each firm in each market unaltered. Since the
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global size of the firm is unchanged under this setting, firms’ incentives to
undertake process innovation activities have not been altered This result is
challenged in the next section.
4 Costly Trade
The recent literature on trade and firm heterogeneity has suggested that both
fixed and variable trade costs are important in international trade activities
(Roberts and Tyebout, 1998). In this section, I introduce both types of
costs and show that the main implication of it, self-selection into exporting
markets, together with differences in factor endowments generate important
consequences for innovation. Self-selection into exporting creates asymme-
tries across firms within an industry. Differences in factor endowments create
asymmetries across sectors. The interaction between both expand business
opportunities of the most productive firms to a larger extent in the compar-
ative advantage industry. This induces differences in innovation outcomes
across industries and consequently differences in the average productivity
across industries. Unlike BRS these differences in productivity arise through
two channels: an effect on the survival productivity threshold due to tougher
selection which creates a reallocation effect towards most productive plants,
and an effect on the within-plant productivity.
In this economy, to get one unit of the product sold in the foreign market,
a firm must ship τi ≥ 1 units of the product incurring into a variable trade
cost of τi−1. To serve the foreign market the firm needs to incur also in a fixed
cost fiX units of the intermediate input used in production. As commented
before, we assume that exporting activities uses the same intermediate input
as innovation and production activities within the same industry. A great
part of this fixed cost of exporting consists on advertisement and complying
with regulation standards. I assume that these costs are proportional to the
unitary production cost. To outline the role played by factor endowments on
innovation outcomes, we assume that sectoral structural parameters other
than factor endowments are identical across countries.
As it is discussed in Navas and Sala (2013) this model exhibits different
equilibria depending on the parameter configuration. These are associated
with different partitions of firms according to innovation and export status.
In the world I describe here, the variety of equilibria becomes more interesting
since different industries could in principle sustain different type of equilibria
depending on the value of fixed costs of exporting, innovation and trade
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barriers. Rather than describing a large variety of cases, in this paper, I focus
on a symmetric equilibrium (by assuming that all industries share the same
structural parameters) and an equilibrium in which innovators are a subset of
the most productive exporters for both industries and countries, in line with
recent evidence found by Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011). Consequently, both
industries are characterized by a partition of firms across status given by the
following hierarchy: Innovators and exporters (the most productive ones),
exporters and domestic firms. In a further section I describe the conditions
under which this equilibrium holds, and through simulations we show that
this equilibrium holds provided that the level of variable trade costs are low
enough.4
For further analysis we denote with superscript j = H,F the variables
associated with the home country and with superscript k = H,F the vari-
ables associated with the destination country (both of them can be either
Home (H) or Foreign (F)).
In this equilibrium, the marginal innovator is an exporter. Consequently,
the marginal innovator in country j and industry i is defined by the following
condition:(
1 + τ 1−σi
Rk
Rj
(
P ki
P ji
)σ−1)(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)(riD(ϕjiI)
σ
)
= δfiI
(
ωji
)
i = 1, 2
(7)
where we have used the fact that Rj1 = αR
j and Rk1 = αR
k The marginal
exporter in country j is described by the following expression:(
τ 1−σi
Rk
Rj
(
P ki
P ji
)σ−1)(
riD(ϕ
j
iX)
σ
)
= fiX
(
ωji
)
(8)
and the marginal survival is given by the following condition:
riD(ϕ
j
iI)
σ
= fiD
(
ωji
)
. (9)
Dividing (8) and (9) we find that:
ϕjiX
ϕjiD
= τi
(
P ji
P ki
)(
Rj
Rk
fiX
fiD
) 1
σ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λji
(10)
4Robustness checks available upon request analyse how the results vary under industry
symmetry with different hierarchical structures.
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Dividing (7) and (9) I obtain:(
ϕjiI
ϕjiD
)σ−1
=
δfiI
fiD
(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1) (1 + (Λji)1−σ fiXfiD) (11)
Notice that as a consequence of trade openness, there is a larger pro-
portion of firms undertaking process innovation in both industries, and this
result is independent of factor endowments. This is the consequence of the
fact that innovators have access to a larger market where they can take ad-
vantage of the increasing returns to scale nature of innovation. Taking the
ratio across industries we have that:(
ϕj1I
ϕj1D
)σ−1
(
ϕj2I
ϕj2D
)σ−1 =
(
1 +
(
Λj2
)1−σ fiX
fiD
)
(
1 +
(
Λj1
)1−σ fiX
fiD
) (12)
and therefore we can conclude that
(
ϕj1I
ϕj1D
)σ−1
<
(
ϕj2I
ϕj2D
)σ−1
iff Λj1 < Λ
j
2.
This implies that those industries exhibiting a larger proportion of firms
innovating are also those industries in which there is a larger proportion of
firms exporting.
In the appendix I discuss the aggregation properties of the model under
costly trade. Compared to the benchmark case of firm heterogeneity with-
out technology upgrading, I observe that the difference in profits between
autarky and trade is larger in this setup due to the effect that trade has on
process innovation. Trade openness increases the size of the market for the
most productive firms and consequently their sales. For a given innovation
productivity threshold, the innovators are able to exploit their knowledge ad-
vantage across more production units since they are able to sell more. This
increases profits. Substituting the expression for profits in the Free Entry
condition and rearranging terms it can be obtained:[
pijiD + p
j
iXpi
j
iX + p
j
iIpi
j
iI
]
=
δfei
1−G(ϕjiD)
(13)
Looking at this condition we can deduct several properties. First, trade
openness improves the average productivity in both industries by increasing
the productivity threshold to survive in the market. Second the inclusion of
process innovation increases the effect that trade has on average productivity.
This is due to the fact that trade increases technology upgrading across
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the most productive firms helping them to increase their market share in
detrimental of the local competitors.
Specific to this paper is the asymmetric impact on innovation across in-
dustries. More precisely I show in the appendix that:
Proposition 1 Under costly trade:
1. The increase in the survival productivity threshold is larger in the in-
dustry in which the economy has a comparative advantage.
2. In the industry in which the economy has a comparative advantage there
is a relative larger share of incumbent firms undertaking process inno-
vation.
3. Assuming a Pareto-Distribution for productivity, the R&D intensities
are larger in the sector in which the economy has comparative advantage
and this is due to a joint effect of more product and process innovation.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind these results underlies on the fact that when the
economy opens to trade, firms are asymmetrically exposed to different indus-
try opportunities. In the home skilled-abundant country, the marginal cost
of production in industry 1 is lower than in the Foreign Country. When the
economy opens up to trade, firms see their opportunities expanded in trade
because the access to a larger market allows them to exploit the increasing
returns to scale associated with both production and innovation. However,
these profit opportunities are larger in the industry in which the economy
has the comparative advantage since this industry is able to offer the good
cheaper than its analogous counterpart in the foreign country (Industry 1).
This promotes a disproportionate entry in that industry, and consequently
more product innovation. The massive entry of firms makes profits fall and
it becomes more difficult to survive. The less productive firms can no longer
make positive profits and consequently the productivity threshold needed
to survive in the market increases. The expulsion of the less efficient firms
generates a reallocation of market shares across the most productive firms.
Process innovation increases due to a combination of larger opportunities
and market share reallocation.
For this equilibrium to hold the following parameter constraints need to
be satisfied:
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1. The marginal innovator must be an exporter. (i.e.
(
ϕjiI
ϕjiX
)σ−1
> 1). This
implies: (((
Λji
)σ−1 fiD
fiX
)
+ 1
)
<
δfiI
fiX
(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)
Substituting (10) and rearranging terms, we have that:
τσ−1i
(
Rj
Rk
)(
P ji
P ki
)σ−1
<
δfiI
fiX
(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1) − 1
2. The productivity threshold of an exporter must be larger than the
domestic one which implies
(
ϕjiX
ϕjiD
)σ−1
> 1 :
τσ−1i
(
Rj
Rk
)(
P ji
P ki
)σ−1
>
fiD
fiX
Writing both conditions together we have that:
fiD
fiX
< τσ−1i
(
Rj
Rk
)(
P ji
P ki
)σ−1
<
δfiI
fiX
(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1) − 1 (14)
If the following condition is satisfied:
τσ−1i
(
Rj
Rk
)(
P ji
P ki
)σ−1
<
fiD
fiX
then all firms will be able to export. In that case the economy will be in an
equilibrium with costly trade but no selection into exporting markets.
Condition (14) depends on four endogenous variables and the model does
not exhibit a closed form solution for these variables. The next simulation
exercise suggests that this equilibrium holds in the case in which transporta-
tion costs are not large enough and there are no substantial differences in
factor endowments across countries. In the next section I look at the proper-
ties of this equilibrium. As it becomes apparent, while trade has introduced
technological divergence across industries, due to a combination of trade bar-
riers and differences in factor intensity usage, these technological differences
across industries could become smaller as the trade costs are reduced. This
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suggests that while trade openness create a Ricardian comparative advantage
across industries, the width of the comparative advantage depends clearly on
the level of trade costs. If the initial situation is one of low trade costs, this
comparative advantage becomes weaker over time, as trade costs are reduced
over time. This could be consistent with recent empirical evidence found by
Levchenko and Zhang (2011).
5 Simulation Exercises
In this section I undertake several simulation exercises which corroborates
the results discussed in the theoretical part. Firstly, I compare the results
in autarky with the results in Free Trade and second, I discuss the effects
of a partial trade liberalisation experiment (a reduction in trade costs). In
this subsection for the common parameters, we stick to the parameter values
provided by Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007). These ones can provide
us with a better comparison between the two models and the role played by
innovation in the productivity convergence across industries.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
Table 1 shows the results in autarky and free trade for the home country
(similar ones you can find for the foreign country). Notice that a movement
towards free trade increases the survival productivity cutoff and reduces the
innovation productivity cutoff promoting technology upgrading. However,
these effects are not the same across industries. In the comparative advantage
industry there is more selection due to an increase in the mass of entrants
(attracted by larger expected profits) and a lower innovation productivity
cutoff (since trade expand the business opportunities of local firms more in
the comparative advantage industry). The effects on the average produc-
tivity for the benchmark case are large (taking into account that under the
current parametrization only 3.75 and 3.5% of the incumbent firms under-
take process innovation). In the comparative advantage industry there is an
increase in the mass of varieties created while in the comparative disadvan-
tage industry is clearly reduced. This reflects the differences in profitability
between both industries which reallocates potential entrants from the com-
parative disadvantage industry to the comparative advantage one. However,
although the proportion of surviving firms is clearly large in the comparative
advantage industry, there is a clear drop in surviving in both industries.5
5As commented above, I have used BRS parameter values for the common parameters
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE.
Figure 1 shows the export and domestic productivity cutoffs for both
industries in the home country. The continuous line displays the survival
productivity thresholds for both industries while the discontinuous one shows
the export productivity cutoffs. The red lines represent the industry in which
the industry has the comparative advantage (industry 1) while the green
one does it for the industry with the comparative disadvantage (industry
2). It is clear that the survival productivity cutoff is larger and the export
productivity cutoff is smaller in the industry in which the economy has the
comparative advantage. The former reflects tougher competition in that
industry due to the larger expanded opportunities for firms in that industry.
Compared to a model without innovation, the survival productivity cutoffs
in both industries have increased considerably. In the comparative advantage
industry for the case of the trade costs equal to 20% the productivity cutoff is
3.8% larger while in the comparative disadvantage industry it is 3.67% larger.
Although small, we can also observe that when we introduce the possibility
of firms to upgrade their own technologies in a model with firm heterogeneity
and comparative advantage the difference between productivity cutoffs due
to comparative advantage mechanisms across industries exacerbates.
Considering a more general case in which the fixed costs of exporting are
not equal to the fixed costs of production, just confirm the qualitative results
that we have obtained as figure 2 provides.
INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE.
Figure 3 displays the relative survival productivity cutoffs of Industry
1 versus Industry 2 for both the home and the foreign country. It becomes
apparent that for high level of transportation costs a reduction in transporta-
tion costs increases the survival productivity cutoff by more in the compara-
tive advantage industry. However for sufficiently low levels of transportation
costs, the opposite happens. This suggests that when the trade costs are
high selection becomes tougher in the industries in which the economy has
the comparative advantage but as the trade costs fall survival is more difficult
in the comparative disadvantage industry.
in the model. This provides a more accurate interpretation of the results by comparing a
model with and without process innovation. For the value innovation jump we have used
20% (θ = 1.2) and for the innovation cost we have used 25 times the cost of entry. Changes
in the parameter values do not generate qualitative changes in the results, provided that
the economy is in the analysed equilibrium. Robustness checks are available on request.
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INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE.
Figure 4 displays the innovation productivity cutoff across both indus-
tries for the home country. The continuous line represents the innovation
productivity cutoff in the industry 1 while the discontinuous line represents
the productivity cutoff in industry 2 for different values of trade costs. It
becomes apparent that a reduction in trade costs, decreases the innovation
productivity cutoffs in both industries, or in another words increases the
mass of firms that upgrade their technology. Yet, it can be also observed
that the innovation productivity cutoff is smaller in the industry in which
the home country has the comparative advantage and consequently the mass
of firms engaging in process innovation is larger in the comparative advantage
industry.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE.
Figure 5 represents the relative innovation productivity cutoffs (industry
1 versus industry 2) for both the home country (continuous line) and the for-
eign country (discontinuous line). The results suggest an interesting finding.
While the relative innovation cutoff is systematically larger in each country’s
comparative disadvantage industry there is a non-monotonic relationship be-
tween the trade costs and the relative evolution of both cutoffs, which is a
measure of the process innovation activity. When the trade costs are high, a
reduction in trade costs decreases by more the innovation cutoff in the com-
parative advantage industry, (decreasing the relative cutoff for industry 1 in
the home country and increasing the relative cutoff in the foreign country).
However, when the trade costs are low enough we find the opposite result: A
reduction in trade costs decreases the innovation cutoff more in the compar-
ative disadvantage industry (and consequently the relative cutoff increases
in the home country and decreases in the foreign country).
These results suggest that a reduction in trade costs increases process
innovation in both industries. When the trade costs are substantially high
however, the reduction in trade costs favours the comparative advantage
industry and when the trade costs are low the trade cost reduction favours
the comparative disadvantage one. The implications for the evolution of
the average productivity across industries are straightforward: A process of
globalisation induces an increase in TFP in both industries provided that
the trade costs are not relatively high (we are in the parameter configuration
consistent with this equilibrium). Yet, globalisation induces TFP divergence
across sectors when trade costs are high, but it induces TFP convergence
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across sectors when countries are low. This prediction is consistent with the
findings of Levchenko and Zhang (2011), provided that trade costs have been
declining over time, and they were relatively low at the start of the sample.
More precisely, the threshold level below which a reduction in trade costs
induce TFP convergence is around 15%, although this threshold is much
higher for innovation cutoffs and R&D intensities (30%).6 Figures 6 and 7
illustrate this point.
INSERT FIGURES 6 AND 7 HERE.
Figure 8 shows the effects of trade liberalisation on product innovation
in both industries. As it becomes apparent, product innovation is already
larger in the comparative advantage relative to the comparative disadvantage
industry in each of the countries. As trade costs are reduced the differences
between product innovation across industries are enlarged: Product inno-
vation becomes larger in the comparative advantage industry. This is the
consequence of the fact that trade liberalisation expands the opportunities
of the most productive firms in the comparative advantage sector and the
increase in the expected profits in this sector promotes entry. In the com-
parative disadvantage sector domestic firms face disproportionate tougher
competition, the average expected profit falls and this deters entry.
INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE.
A common measure of innovative activity across industries is to look at
R&D intensities. Figure 9 displays the evolution of the R&D intensities for
both industries in the home country. Notice that R&D intensities increase in
both industries as trade costs fall. Although the differences across industries
are not substantially large there are still differences in R&D intensities when
the economy is open to trade favouring the comparative advantage industry in
the home country. This is the consequence of the fact that in the comparative
advantage industry there is more product and process innovation.
INSERT FIGURE 9 AND 10 HERE.
If we compare the relative evolution of R&D intensities in the home coun-
try (continuous line) and the foreign country (discontinuous line) we obtain
a similar message (figure 10). The figure displays a similar functional form
to figure 3. When the trade costs are large, a reduction in the trade costs
6That is, the relative innovation cutoffs and R&D intensities increase by more in the
comparative disadvantage industry when trade costs are below 30%
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increases the R&D intensity by more in the comparative advantage industry
in each country. However, if the trade costs are sufficiently small, the reverse
happens and the R&D intensities increases by more in the comparative dis-
advantage industry. When trade costs are high further liberalisation leads to
divergence in innovative activity across industries but this result is reversed
if the trade costs are sufficiently small.
6 Conclusions
This paper introduces technology upgrading into a factor proportions’ model
with firm heterogeneity to explore how factor endowments shape the impact
that trade has on innovation at an industry level.
Our results suggest that factor endowments affect the distribution of inno-
vative activity across industries within a country when the economy opens to
trade. More precisely, firms in the industry where the economy has a com-
parative advantage undertake more product and process innovation. This
reinforces previous results that outline the importance of the relative factor
endowments in generating a Ricardian comparative advantage.
In addition I explore how the evolution of technology is affected by a re-
duction in trade costs under the presence of differences in factor endowments
across countries and factor intensities across industries. The results suggest
that the reduction in variable trade costs promotes technology upgrading and
increases R&D intensities in both industries. However, the results establish
a non-monotonic relationship between the pattern of comparative advantage
and trade costs: When the trade costs are high, a reduction in trade costs
pushes technology upgrading more in the comparative advantage industry
leading to TFP divergence across industries. However, when the trade costs
are low enough, a reduction in trade costs pushes technology upgrading in the
comparative disadvantage industry leading to a process of TFP convergence
across both industries.
This paper could be extended in several directions. First, the paper has
considered a simple process of technology upgrading where the degree of
technology upgrade is fixed across firms. Generalising the results to a richer
environment in which firms can choose how much to upgrade is a promising
area for future research. Second, the paper could allow for a more complete
and realistic description of the intermediate input sector and establishes the
complementarities between importing, exporting and innovation under the
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presence of differences in factor endowments. Both dimensions are currently
taking part on my research agenda.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Aggregation in a Closed Economy Model
Define the following productivity distributions:
Pr (ϕ/ϕ ≥ ϕiD) = µiD(ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕiD) , if ϕ ≥ ϕiD
0 otherwise
}
Pr (ϕ/ϕ ≥ ϕiI) = µiI(ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕiI) , if ϕ ≥ ϕiI
0 otherwise
}
the second one, that is more associated to heterogenous firm models of
process innovation will be the ex-ante productivity distribution of innovators.
We can show that parallel to the Melitz (2003) model the aggregation
property also holds in this model. This allows to write the sectoral aggregate
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variables of the model as a function of the average productivity of the sector.
The right average productivity of each industry is given by the following
expression:
ϕ˜ =
[
(ϕ˜iD)
σ−1 +
(1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))
[
(θi)
σ−1 − 1] (ϕ˜iI)σ−1]
where:
(ϕ˜iD)
σ−1 =
∞∫
ϕiD
ϕσ−1µ (ϕ) dϕ
and
(ϕ˜iI)
σ−1 =
∞∫
ϕiI
ϕσ−1µI (ϕ) dϕ
In equilibrium we must have that:
E(Vi) = feiωi
This condition is known in the Melitz (2003) framework as the Free Entry
condition (FE). It can be rearranged to:
E(V i) =
(1−G(ϕiD))
δ
pi (ϕ˜iD) +
innovation profits︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))
[(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)(r (ϕ˜iI)
σ
)
− fiIωi
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
p¯ii
= f eiωi
Compared to a standard model of firm heterogeneity without technology
upgrading, this new FE condition exhibits a new element in the left hand
side of the equation. More precisely, the second element captures the ex-
pected profits from technology upgrading which are given by the probability
of innovate conditional on surviving and the innovation rents.
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8 Aggregation in Costly Trade.
Define the following productivity distribution:
Pr
(
ϕ/ϕ ≥ ϕjiX
)
= µiX(ϕ) =
{
g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕjiX)
, if ϕ ≥ ϕjiX
0 otherwise
}
This is the conditional productivity distribution of exporters to country
j. Define also the following average productivity:
(
ϕ˜jiX
)σ−1
=
∞∫
ϕjiX
ϕσ−1µX (ϕ) dϕ
and consider as well the following productivity averages:
(
ϕ˜jiX
)
=
[
M jiX
(
ϕ˜jiX
)σ−1
+
(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1)M jiI (ϕ˜jiI)σ−1
M jiX
] 1
σ−1
Then the aggregate price index for each sector in each market will remain
as follows:(
P ji
)1−σ
=
[
M ji
(
p
(
ϕ˜ji
))1−σ
+MkiX
(
p
(
ϕ˜kiX
))1−σ]
.
The expected profits from a potential entrant are given by:
E(V ji ) =
(1−G(ϕjiD))
δ
[
pi
(
ϕ˜jiD
)
+ pjiXpi
(
ϕ˜jiX
)
+ pjiIpiiI
(
ϕ˜jiI
)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
p¯ii
where pi
(
ϕ˜jiD
)
=
((
ϕ˜jiD
ϕjiD
)σ−1
− 1
)
fiD = pi
j
iD, pi
(
ϕ˜jiX
)
=
((
ϕ˜jiX
ϕjiX
)σ−1
− 1
)
fiX =
pijiX and piiI
(
ϕ˜jiI
)
=
[(
(θi)
σ−1 − 1) (1 + (Λji)1−σ fiXfiD)
(
r(ϕ˜jiI)
σ
)
− δfiI
]
are
the innovation profits.
Compared to autarky this equation has two extra terms. The second
term captures the profits from exporting. The third term captures the in-
novation profits in which we can distinguish between the innovation gains in
the domestic market and the ones in the foreign market. Both are positive
so this implies that the expected profits increase after trade openness.
Proposition 2 Under costless trade FPE holds.
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Proof. As in HK (1985) or BRS (2007), first we are going to characterize
the equilibrium in an hypothetical integrated economy. Then we are going
to show that there is a vector of prices and initial allocations that support
this equilibrium in the non-integrated economies.
The very first thing to show is that total revenue equals total expenditure
in each sector. To see this notice that:
wLLip + wSSip + wLLei + wSSei + wLLiI + wSSiI = Ri
In each sector, the following needs to hold:
wLLip + wSSip + wLLiI + wSSiI = Ri − Πi
Since now the aggregate profits also include the benefits from innovation.
Developing the expression for profits we obtain:
Πi = Mi
[
r (ϕ˜)
σ
− fDωi − (1−G(ϕiI))
(1−G (ϕiD))fIωi
]
On the other hand we know that the FE implies that:
Πi = Mip¯ii =
Miδfeiωi
(1−G (ϕiD) = Meiδfeiωi = wLLei + wSSei.
Then we have that
wLLi + wSSi = Ri
aggregating across industries implies that:
wLL¯+ wSS¯ = R (15)
Now let us characterize the equilibrium of the integrated economy. The
assumption of Cobb-Douglas technologies ensure that:
wLLi = (1− βi)Ri wSSi = βiRi
Labor market clearing condition implies:
(1− β1)α
wL
R +
(1− β2) (1− α)
wL
R = L¯
β1α
wS
R +
β2 (1− α)
wS
R = S¯
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and dividing both:
wL
wS
=
(1− β1)α + (1− β2) (1− α)
β1α + β2 (1− α)
S¯
L¯
(16)
Notice also that manipulating both labour market clearing conditions we
find that:
R
wL
=
L¯
(1− β1)α + (1− β2) (1− α) ;
R
wS
=
S¯
β1α + β2 (1− α)
which leads to:
L1 =
(1− β1)α
(1− β1)α + (1− β2) (1− α) ; S1 =
β1α
β1α + β2 (1− α)
L2 =
(1− β2)α
(1− β1)α + (1− β2) (1− α) ; S2 =
β2 (1− α)
β1α + β2 (1− α)
Consider w.l.o.g. that wS = 1. Notice that the productivity and innova-
tion cutoffs (ϕiD) , (ϕiI) can be easily solved using (6) and (5) and with this
we obtain p
(
ϕki
)
. Equation (15) can be used together with (16) to obtain R.
Using (6) and the information about (ϕiD) , (ϕiI) we obtain an expression for
r¯i. This help us to compute Pi, ϕ˜iD, ϕ˜iI . With this the integrated equilibrium
is characterized. To obtain the number of surviving firms in each industry
we use 4 and the fact that for each industry Mi = Ri/r¯i.
Now let us show that this relative wage satisfies the equilibrium conditions
of the open economy but costless trade.
To do so let us consider without loss of generalisation that.wHS = w
F
S = 1.
Notice that perfect competition in the intermediate input sector implies
that:
SHi = βiR
H
i ⇒ wLLHi = (1− βi)RHi
then
SHi
LHi
= βi
1−βi
wL
wS
= βi
1−βiwL.
The factor market conditions can be expressed as:
λjL1
(
Sj1
Lj1
)
+
(
1− λjL1
)(Sj2
Lj2
)
=
(
S¯j
L¯j
)
λjS1
(
Lj1
Sj1
)
+
(
1− λjL1
)(Lj2
Sj2
)
=
(
L¯j
S¯j
)
where λjLi =
Lji
L¯j
and λjS1 =
Sji
S¯j
.Given that we are able to get:
Lj1 =
S¯j
wL
−
(
β2
1−β2
)
L¯j(
β1
1−β1
)
−
(
β2
1−β2
) ; Lj2 =
(
β1
1−β1
)
L¯j − S¯j
wL(
β1
1−β1
)
−
(
β2
1−β2
) ;
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Sj1 =
(
β1
1−β1
)
S¯j −
(
β1
1−β1
)(
β2
1−β2
)
wLL¯
j(
β1
1−β1
)
−
(
β2
1−β2
) ; Sj2 =
(
β1
1−β1
)(
β2
1−β2
)
wLL¯
j −
(
β2
1−β2
)
S¯j(
β1
1−β1
)
−
(
β2
1−β2
)
Aggregate Income in each country equals aggregate revenue and so:
Rj = S¯j + wLL¯
j
We know that total industry payments to unskilled labour are a constant
fraction (1− βi) of the total industry revenue and the total industry revenue
is a fraction α of the total revenue. Substituting the values of Lk1 in
wL
(
LH1 + L
F
1
)
= (1− β1)α
[
S¯H + S¯F + wL
(
L¯H + L¯F
)]
we obtain an expression for wL that coincides with the one obtained in the
integrated equilibrium. Notice that this determines p
(
ϕji
)
which determines
Pi. We have shown that there exists a vector of allocations and competitive
prices that replicates the equilibrium of the integrated economy.
8.1 Proof of ΛH1 < Λ
H
2 and Λ
F
1 > Λ
F
2
This proof is very similar to the analogous one in BRS (2007). The firs step
is to obtain the relative aggregate price indexes in autarky. Notice that:
P j1
P j2
=
(
M j1
M j2
) 1
1−σ
p1(ϕ˜
j
1)
p2(ϕ˜
j
2)
Since the innovation and the survival productivity cutoffs are the same,
the price of the average firm in each industry is only determined by differences
in the cost of the intermediate input and consequently,
P j1
P j2
=
(
M j1
M j2
) 1
1−σ
(
wjS
wjL
)β1−β2
Substituting the expression for
Mk1
Mk2
and rearranging terms it can be ob-
tained:
P j1
P j2
=
α
1− α
(
wjS
wjL
)σ(β1−β2)
1−σ
and consequently in autarky:
PH1
PH2
<
PF1
PF2
since
wHS
wHL
<
wFS
wFL
and β1 > β2.
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In Costless trade
wHS
wHL
=
wFS
wFL
and consequently,
PH1
PH2
=
PF1
PF2
.
In Costly trade:
P j1
P j2
=
M j1
[(
p
(
ϕ˜j1
))1−σ
+ pk1X
(
p
(
ϕ˜k1X
))1−σ]
M j2
[(
p
(
ϕ˜j2
))1−σ
+ pkiX
(
p
(
ϕ˜k2X
))1−σ]

where pjiX =
(
ϕiX
ϕiD
)−γ
. Notice that if τ → ∞, piX → 0 and P
j
1
P j2
=(
Mj1
Mj2
) 1
1−σ
(
wjS
wjL
)β1−β2
since the productivity and the innovation cutoffs are
the same across industries (autarkic case). Then
PH1
PH2
<
PF1
PF2
. In the case of
τ → 1,and fiX → 0 then pjiX → 1 and ϕjiX = ϕjiD ∀ i, j. We are conse-
quently in the case of free trade where the relative prices are equalised across
countries. For intermediate cases of fixed and variable trade costs the relative
prices underlie between the two values: the autarkic and the free trade value.
Notice that
Λj1
Λj2
= α
1−α
P j1
P j2
provided that the fixed and variable trade costs
are the same across industries. Consequently in costly trade we have that
ΛH1 < Λ
H
2 and Λ
F
1 > Λ
F
2 .
8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
8.2.1 Point 1.
To see the first point, notice that we can express condition (13) in terms of
the productivity threshold ϕiD. Using equation (10) and the expression for
piix I can express the expected value of profits from exporting as:
pjiXpi
j
iX =
(
1−G(ΛjiϕiD
)
)(
1−G (ϕjiD))
( ϕ˜jiX
ϕjiD
)σ−1 (
Λji
)1−σ − 1
 fiX (ωji )
This expression is decreasing in Λji . Using (11) I obtain the expected
profits from innovation, which are given by:
pjiIpi
j
iI =
(
1−G(ϕjiI
)
)(
1−G (ϕjiD))
( ϕ˜jiI
ϕjiD
)σ−1fiD ((θi)σ−1 − 1)
(
1 +
(
Λji
)1−σ fiX
fiD
)
δfiI
− 1
 δfiI
that is also decreasing in Λji .
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Since before we have shown that ΛH1 < Λ
H
2 and Λ
F
1 > Λ
F
2 , then we have
that the left hand side of condition (13) is larger in industry 1 than in industry
2 in the home country. Consequently the productivity threshold is larger in
industry 1 than in industry 2.
Consequently, The second part of the statement (2) is just a consequence
of this result together with the condition (12).
8.2.2 Point 2.
Condition (12). suggests that
(
ϕj1I
ϕj1D
)σ−1
<
(
ϕj2I
ϕj2D
)σ−1
iff Λj1 < Λ
j
2. Since
ΛH1 < Λ
H
2 and Λ
F
1 > Λ
F
2 , then
(
ϕ1I
ϕ1D
)H
<
(
ϕ2I
ϕ2D
)H
and
(
ϕ1I
ϕ1D
)F
>
(
ϕ2I
ϕ2D
)F
.
8.2.3 Point 3
Let us focus on the home country but the result is similar for the foreign
country. We therefore omit the superscript j for simplicity. The relative
R&D intensities are given by:
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
(
δfei
(1−G(ϕ1D)) + δfiI
(1−G(ϕ1I))
(1−G(ϕ1D))
)
(
δfei
(1−G(ϕ2D)) + δfiI
(1−G(ϕ2I))
(1−G(ϕ2D))
)M1 (ω1)
M2 (ω2)
R2
R1
Using the fact that Ri = Mir¯i and rearranging terms we have that:
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
(
δfei
(1−G(ϕ1D)) + δfiI
(1−G(ϕ1I))
(1−G(ϕ1D))
)
(
δfei
(1−G(ϕ2D)) + δfiI
(1−G(ϕ2I))
(1−G(ϕ2D))
) r¯2ω1
r¯1ω2
The first term is larger in industry 1 since on the one hand, ϕ1D > ϕ2D
and therefore in principle there’s more entry in industry 1 and on the other
hand we have that (1−G(ϕ1I))
(1−G(ϕ1D)) >
(1−G(ϕ2I))
(1−G(ϕ2D)) , and then the proportion of firms
undertaking process innovation is larger. However, the average revenue in
industry 1 is larger since this is the industry in which the economy has a
comparative advantage. To derive the net effect we are going to focus on the
particular case of the Pareto Distribution. Assuming that the productivity
cumulative distribution function takes the following functional form:
Pr(ϕ ≤ ϕ0) = 1−
(
m
ϕ0
)γ
γ > σ − 1.
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The average revenue is given by the following expression:
r¯i =
γ
γ − (σ − 1) [fiD + piXfix + piIfiI ] (ωi) (17)
and the average profit is given by the following expression:
p¯ii =
σ − 1
γ − (σ − 1) [fiD + piXfiX + piIfiI ] (ωi) (18)
Using (13), (17) and (18) we have that:
r¯i =
γ
(σ − 1)
δfei (ωi)
(1−G(ϕiD))
and consequently:
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
=
(
fei
(1−G(ϕ1D)) + fiI
(1−G(ϕ1I))
(1−G(ϕ1D))
)
(
fei
(1−G(ϕ2D)) + fiI
(1−G(ϕ2I))
(1−G(ϕ2D))
) (1−G(ϕ1D))
(1−G(ϕ2D)) =
(δfei + δfiI (1−G(ϕ1I)))
(δfei + δfiI (1−G(ϕ2I)))
Clearly,
(
R&Dint1
R&Dint2
)H
> 1 iff (ϕ1I)
H < (ϕ2I)
H .
Under the Pareto Distribution, the survival productivity cutoffs are given
by:
ϕiD =
(
σ − 1
γ − (σ − 1)
[
fiD + piXfiX + piIδfiI
δfei
]) 1
γ
m
and using (11), the innovation cutoff is given by:
ϕiI = (piI)
−γ
(
σ − 1
γ − (σ − 1)
[
fiD + piXfiX + piIδfiI
δfei
]) 1
γ
m
Rearranging terms, I get:
ϕiI =
(
σ − 1
γ − (σ − 1)
[
fiD
piI
+ piX
piI
fiX + δfiI
δfei
]) 1
γ
m (19)
Below dϕiI
dΛi
> 0. is shown.
For the sake of simplicity, let us make the following transformation. Let
call z = (Λi)
1−σ fiX
fiD
. Notice that then show dϕiI
dΛi
> 0 is equivalent to show
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dϕiI
dz
< 0. Without loss of generalization I am going to show it for sector 1.
Recall that:
p1I =
(
δf1I
f1D
(
(θ1)
σ−1 − 1) (1 + z)
) −γ
σ−1
and that
p1X
p1I
=
(
zδf1I
f1X
(
(θ1)
σ−1 − 1) (1 + z)
) γ
σ−1
Notice that dϕiI
dz
< 0 is equivalent to show that df
dz
< 0,
where f = (1 + z)
−γ
σ−1
(
(f1D)
σ−γ−1
σ−1 + z
γ
σ−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1
)
.
Taking derivatives we have that:
−γ
σ − 1 (1 + z)
−γ
σ−1−1
(
(f1D)
σ−γ−1
σ−1 + z
γ
σ−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1
)
+
γ
σ − 1z
γ
σ−1−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1 (1 + z)
−γ
σ−1
Rearranging terms we get:
γ (1 + z)
−γ
σ−1
σ − 1
[
− (1 + z)−1
(
(f1D)
σ−γ−1
σ−1 + z
γ
σ−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1
)
+
1
z
z
γ
σ−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1
]
Multiplying the entire expression by z and rearranging terms:
γ (1 + z)
−γ
σ−1
σ − 1
[
− z
1 + z
(f1D)
σ−γ−1
σ−1 +
1
1 + z
z
γ
σ−1 (f1X)
σ−γ−1
σ−1
]
This is negative if the second term is negative, which implies
z
γ−(σ−1)
σ−1
(
f1X
f1D
)σ−γ−1σ−1
< 1
This condition therefore requires that:
(
f1X
zf1D
)σ−γ−1σ−1
< 1 or expressed in
another terms: (Λi)
σ−γ−1 < 1. Since γ > σ−1, this condition is satisfied as to
get the partition between exporters and nonexporters we need that Λi > 1.
Notice that as Λji increases the innovation productivity threshold in-
creases. Since in this free trade equilibrium ΛH1 < Λ
H
2 and Λ
F
1 > Λ
F
2 then
we can conclude that ϕH1I < ϕ
H
2I and ϕ
F
1I > ϕ
F
2I . Therefore, there is a larger
proportion of firms undertaking process innovation in the comparative ad-
vantage industry.
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Paremeter Autarky Free Trade Percentage Variation
ϕ1D 0.42886 0.5171 20.57
ϕ2D 0.42886 0.50675 18.16
ϕ1I 1.20211 1.13761 -5.36
ϕ2I 1.20211 1.13963 -5.19
ϕ˜1 0.79419 1.0876 36.95
ϕ˜2 0.79419 1.06432 34.01
M1 499.376 271.409 -45.65
M2 481.494 113.380 -77.29
M e1 152.93 171.511 12.63
M e2 152.27 66.87 -56.09
Table 1: A movement from autarky towards FreeTrade
9 Tables and figures
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Figure 1: Export and domestic productivity cutoffs: The continuous line
represents the survival productivity cutoffs for both industries while the dis-
continuous line represents the export productivity cutoff for both industries.
The red line represents the industry in which the economy has the compara-
tive advantage. As it can be seen, in the industry in which the economy has
the comparative advantage the survival productivity threshold is definitely
larger. However, the export productivity cutoff is smaller.
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Figure 2: Export and domestic productivity cutoffs (Selection into exporting
with τ = 1): The continuous line represents the survival productivity cutoffs
for both industries while the discontinuous line represents the export pro-
ductivity cutoff for both industries. The red line represents the industry in
which the economy has the comparative advantage. As it can be seen, in the
industry in which the economy has the comparative advantage the survival
productivity threshold is definitely larger. However, the export productivity
cutoff is smaller.
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Figure 3: Relative productivity cutoffs. The figure displays the relative pro-
ductivity cutoffs of Industry 1 vs Industry 2 for both the home country
(continuous line) and foreign country (discontinuous line).
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Figure 4: Industry 1 productivity cutoff is represented by the continuous
line while the discontinuous line while the discontinuous line represents the
industry 2 productivity cutoff
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Figure 5: Relative Innovation Cutoffs. This figure displays the relative in-
novation cutoffs (Industry 1 vs Industry 2) for both the Home (continuous
line) and the Foreign country (discontinuous line) as a function of the trade
costs.
40
1 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5 1.55 1.6 1.65 1.7 1.75
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
Relative Average Productivities
Variable Trade Costs tau
R
el
at
iv
e 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
Figure 6: Evolution of the relative average Productivity (Industry 1/Industry
2) in the home (Continuous line) versus the foreign country (Discontinuous
line.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the Average Productivity in Industry 1 (Continuous
line) and Industry 2 (Discontinuous line) in the Home Country.
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Figure 8: Product Innovation in the Home Country. This figure displays the
creation of new varieties for different variable trade costs for both industries,
industry 1 (continuous line) and industry 2 (discontinuous line).
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Figure 9: R&D intensities across industries in the home country. The figure
displays the R&D intensities for industry 1 (continuous line) and industry 2
(discontinuous line) for the home country.
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Figure 10: R&D intensities across industries in the home country. The figure
displays the R&D intensities for industry 1 (continuous line) and industry 2
(discontinuous line) for the home country.
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